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Abstract 
 
Assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and foreign aid has 
presented a challenge to personnel tasked with these operations.  Answering the question 
“are we winning hearts and minds” has similarly eluded military personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  This research presents a review of humanitarian assistance and foreign aid 
conducted by the U.S. government and literature on U.S. military doctrine regarding 
humanitarian assistance and infrastructure investment.  The research builds upon 
expectancy disconfirmation theory to determine the strongest predictors of citizen 
satisfaction with government services.  Case study data was collected in Belize before 
and after a U.S. military humanitarian and civil assistance construction project was 
executed, and this data was analyzed using an expectancy theory model.  The results 
indicate that the model using performance, disconfirmation, and an interaction effect of 
both explains 56% of the variation in citizen satisfaction and proposes a predictive model 
of citizen satisfaction.  This article proposes further research with improvement to the 
survey methods and instrument; it also discusses how the model may not account for an 
unmeasured variable.  Further research is also suggested to determine the relationship of 
time and location on a citizen’s satisfaction rating when considering the impact of a 
humanitarian project.  
AFIT-ENV-MS-15-M-190 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To the countless Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen that put their lives in danger to 
perform reconstruction missions. 
 
 vi 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I am very grateful for my committee chair, Lt Col Peter Feng, for his untiring 
assistance and guidance throughout this thesis process.  Your limitless energy and drive 
during this project, and personal involvement in the data collection and processing, was 
vital to the success of this research.  I also wish to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Al Thal, 
for his sage advice and meticulous review of my writing, although my appreciation for 
this diligent review may not have been apparent at the moment of receipt.  I would also 
like to thank Dr. John Elshaw for his patience in guiding me down countless rabbit-holes 
of analysis through multiple methods and words of encouragement at the precise moment 
of peak frustration with the research process.  I am also thankful for the support from 
Capt Mike Smith, who took on exceptional interest in this research and contributed 
greatly to understanding the assessment process and the objectives of NEW HORIZONS. 
To my classmates in the GEM 15M class I am thankful for the camaraderie, 
support, and assistance over the past 18 months.  I have no doubt you will all soar to great 
heights over your careers and I look forward to serving alongside such men and women 
of great character for years to come. 
Finally, I am forever grateful for the love and support of my parents and family.  
Their support throughout my time as a student has pushed me to perform, and without 
this support I would not have achieved a fraction of my goals. 
 
       Samuel W. Logan 
 vii 
 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. vi 
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. vii 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................x 
List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................... xi 
I.  Introduction .....................................................................................................................1 
Brief Background ............................................................................................................2 
Problem Statement and Research Questions ...................................................................3 
Methodology ...................................................................................................................3 
Scope and Limitations .....................................................................................................4 
Humanitarian Assistance Background ............................................................................6 
Civilian Agency Foreign Assistance ......................................................................... 7 
Department of Defense Foreign Assistance .............................................................. 8 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) .......................................... 10 
Other U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance Programs in Iraq ...................... 12 
Other U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance Programs in Afghanistan ......... 13 
Doctrine Background ....................................................................................................14 
The Joint Operations Process .................................................................................. 15 
Stability Operations ................................................................................................. 17 
COIN Operations ..................................................................................................... 18 
Operations Assessments .......................................................................................... 21 
Impact of Humanitarian Assistance and Foreign Aid ...................................................22 
Citizen Satisfaction Research Background ...................................................................24 
Background on Belize ...................................................................................................28 
Operation NEW HORIZONS 14 ..................................................................................32 
Experiment Design ........................................................................................................33 
Survey Development ............................................................................................... 34 
Survey Procedure .................................................................................................... 36 
Anticipated Significance ...............................................................................................37 
Overview of Remaining Chapters .................................................................................37 
II.  Scholarly Article ..........................................................................................................38 
Abstract .........................................................................................................................38 
 viii 
 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................39 
Background ...................................................................................................................39 
Methodology .................................................................................................................46 
Results ...........................................................................................................................49 
Discussion .....................................................................................................................56 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................58 
III.  Results and Conclusion ...............................................................................................59 
Research Questions Revisited .......................................................................................59 
Review of Findings .......................................................................................................61 
Significance of Research ...............................................................................................67 
Future Research .............................................................................................................67 
Summary .......................................................................................................................69 
Appendix A:  Survey Instrument .......................................................................................70 
Appendix B:  Research Approval Documentation .............................................................72 
Appendix C:  R Code .........................................................................................................74 
Appendix D:  Additional Resampling Results ...................................................................76 
References ..........................................................................................................................78 
Vita. ....................................................................................................................................82 
  
 ix 
 
List of Figures 
 Page 
 
Figure 1: Hansen Research Model ...................................................................................... 5 
Figure 2: Delineation of Research Efforts .......................................................................... 6 
Figure 3: OHDACA and HCA Funding from 2005-2010 ................................................ 10 
Figure 4: The Range of Military Operations..................................................................... 14 
Figure 5: Operations Phases and Military Effort .............................................................. 16 
Figure 6: Afghanistan Stability / COIN System Dynamics Chart .................................... 20 
Figure 7: Expectancy Disconfirmation Model .................................................................. 25 
Figure 8: Expectancy Disconfirmation Model Parameter Estimates ................................ 27 
Figure 9: Map of Belize .................................................................................................... 29 
Figure 10: Citizen's Perceptions of Local Government Services in Belize, 2008-2012 ... 31 
Figure 11: Experiment Design .......................................................................................... 34 
Figure 12: Citizen Satisfaction Expectancy Disconfirmation Model ............................... 45 
Figure 13: Citizen Satisfaction Model .............................................................................. 47 
Figure 14: Predicted vs. Actual Citizen Satisfaction ........................................................ 55 
Figure 15: Histogram of Actual Citizen Satisfaction ........................................................ 62 
Figure 16: Histogram of Predicted Citizen Satisfaction ................................................... 63 
Figure 17: Histogram of Predicted vs Actual Percent Error ............................................. 64 
Figure 18: Predicted and Actual Citizen Satisfaction Values ........................................... 66 
 x 
 
List of Tables 
 Page 
 
Table 1: Operation NEW HORIZONS 14 Project Summary ........................................... 33 
Table 2: Survey Question Structure .................................................................................. 36 
Table 3: Comparison of Original and Resampled Descriptive Statistics .......................... 49 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Hansen Model, R
2
 = 0.565 .......................................... 50 
Table 5: Correlation Table of Variables ........................................................................... 50 
Table 6: Dominance Analysis of Predictors of Citizen Satisfaction................................. 52 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of New Model, R
2
 = 0.564 ............................................... 52 
Table 8: Scenario Analysis of Citizen Satisfaction........................................................... 55 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Citizen Satisfaction Distribution ................................. 65 
Table 10: Round 1 Data .................................................................................................... 76 
Table 11: Round 2 Data .................................................................................................... 76 
Table 12: Non-Project Location Data ............................................................................... 76 
Table 13: Project Location Data ....................................................................................... 76 
Table 14: Round 1 Data at a Non-Project Location .......................................................... 77 
Table 15: Round 1 Data at a Project Location .................................................................. 77 
Table 16: Round 2 Data at a Non-Project Location .......................................................... 77 
Table 17: Round 2 Data at a Project Location .................................................................. 77 
 
  
 xi 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
AFIT – Air Force Institute of Technology 
AOR – Area of Responsibility 
BDF – Belize Defense Force 
CERP – Commanders Emergency Response Program 
COIN – Counter Insurgency 
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority 
CRS – Congressional Research Service 
DFA – Director of Foreign Assistance 
DoD – Department of Defense 
DoS – Department of State 
FDR – Foreign Disaster Response 
FY – Fiscal Year 
GAO – General Accounting Office 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GIS – Geospatial Information System 
HA – Humanitarian Assistance 
HCA – Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons 
IRB – Institution Review Board 
JP – Joint Publication 
LAPOP – Latin America Public Opinion Project 
 xii 
 
MOE – Measures of Effectiveness  
MOP – Measures of Performance 
OHDACA – Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 
PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team 
UN – United Nations 
U.S. – United States 
USACE – United States Army Corps of Engineers 
USAID – United States Agency for International Development 
 1 
PREDICTING CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN 
BELIZE 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The United States (U.S.) military has been heavily involved in combat operations 
since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively.  In both of 
these conflicts, the U.S. military has executed counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns with 
a heavy emphasis on humanitarian assistance projects.  Enormous sums of money have 
been spent in these countries, but measuring the effectiveness of these projects has been 
problematic.  While many measures of performance have been used, such as the number 
of projects completed and dollars spent, measures of effectiveness of a given project are 
rarely implemented.  The recent use of COIN strategies by the U.S. military and the 
increased emphasis on operations intended to build partnerships with developing nations 
necessitates further development of measures of effectiveness for these non-combat 
operations.  The main effort of this research is to evaluate a survey method for measuring 
the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance projects.  
This thesis is in the scholarly article format.  Chapter I begins by presenting 
background information on U.S. government humanitarian assistance programs.  Next, 
the chapter presents the research questions, methodology, and scope of the research.  The 
chapter then presents more in-depth background on U.S government humanitarian 
assistance programs, U.S. military doctrine, the impact of humanitarian assistance, and 
models for explaining citizen satisfaction.  The chapter proceeds with background on 
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Belize, the location of the case study, before detailing aspects of Operation NEW 
HORIZONS 14.  The chapter then discusses the experiment design and survey 
procedures before concluding with a discussion of the anticipated significance of the 
research.  Chapter II is an article to be submitted for publication with the results of this 
research, and Chapter III reviews the research questions, provides more discussion 
regarding the results, and concludes with recommendations for further research. 
 
Brief Background 
The U.S. government executes humanitarian assistance programs around the 
world through a myriad of programs.  While these programs and intentions are diverse, a 
common critique of these programs is that projects are poorly evaluated for effectiveness.  
Criticisms of these programs identify poorly defined goals, nonexistent evaluations of 
past programs, and questionably quantified assessments after completion of projects.  
These criticisms have been amplified in the wake of the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq after 2001, where humanitarian assistance programs have been pivotal elements 
of the U.S. military COIN campaigns.  The U.S. military has outspent the post-World 
War II European reconstruction effort, the Marshal Plan, on reconstruction programs in 
Afghanistan since 2001 when adjusted for inflation to current year dollars (SIGAR, 
2014). 
Despite these massive humanitarian activities, the question of “are we winning 
hearts and minds” remains a difficult question to answer.  The difficulty in answering this 
question is a factor of the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of these projects.  
Measures of effectiveness (MOE) are often selected based on convenience or the ease of 
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quantification, such as numbers of projects or dollars spent, instead of more applicable 
metrics such as change in perception of legitimacy of the host nation government by their 
population.  Recent research also outlines examples where well-meaning assistance may 
be detrimental to security of developing nations and stability of fragile governments. 
 
Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Determining the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance has been a difficult 
problem.  This research will test a method for measuring citizen satisfaction with 
government services in Belize using citizen satisfaction models developed regarding 
government services in U.S. cities.  The key research questions to be answered in this 
research are: 
 Can satisfaction be predicted when the expectations of the population is 
known? 
 Can satisfaction be predicted when the population’s rating of government 
service performance is known? 
 Can satisfaction be predicted when the difference between the population’s 
expectations and perception of government services performance is known? 
 Which factors are most influential on citizen satisfaction?  
 Can guidance be given in target selection to increase return on investment on 
infrastructure targets with respect to citizen satisfaction? 
 Is the model of predicting citizen satisfaction sensitive to sample size? 
 
Methodology 
This research employed citizen satisfaction surveys in order to answer the 
outlined research questions.  Surveys were administered in conjunction with a U.S. 
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military-led humanitarian assistance mission in Belize, where samples were collected in 
the vicinity of these projects.  These survey data were then analyzed to determine the 
predictors of citizen satisfaction using models adapted from citizen satisfaction models 
outlined in detail in Chapter I.  Various regression techniques and dominance analysis 
were conducted on the data to determine the relationships of the predictor variables in 
order to build a predictive regression equation.  Further detail of the survey instrument 
development, survey sampling plan, and experiment designed are also included in this 
chapter, and details of the methodologies used for analysis of the results are included in 
Chapter II. 
 
Scope and Limitations 
This research effort was conducted with another student in the AFIT program and 
was sponsored by Twelfth Air Force (Air Forces Southern).  Both students used the same 
data collected through the same survey method, but two sets of analyses were conducted.  
This thesis research effort builds upon Hansen’s (2015) analysis and further explored the 
application of his analysis towards predicting citizen satisfaction.  In Hansen’s research, 
the Van Ryzin expectancy-disconfirmation model was adapted into the model presented 
in Figure 1, with the interaction of expectations on disconfirmation removed (Hansen, 
2015).  This research intends to explore the combined effects of these variables on citizen 
satisfaction through additional analysis and attempts to predict citizen satisfaction given 
expectations, performance, and disconfirmation are known within a given population. 
 
 5 
Expectation
Performance
Disconfirmation
Citizen 
Satisfaction
 
Figure 1: Hansen Research Model (Hansen, 2015) 
 
The research efforts of the author and Hansen needed to be separate and distinct 
in order to meet the thesis requirement for graduation.  While both students worked 
closely together throughout the research, each student analyzed different aspects of the 
citizen satisfaction research question using different methodologies.  These research 
efforts were delineated into separate topics as illustrated in Figure 2.  Hansen analyzed 
precursors to investment using Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) and tested 
relationships between predictor variables in the citizen satisfaction model, while this 
research effort analyzed the citizen satisfaction problem with a focus on predicting 
satisfaction and determining the most significant predictors in the model. 
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Figure 2: Delineation of Research Efforts 
 
Humanitarian Assistance Background 
The United States has been heavily involved in both humanitarian assistance and 
combat operations from the second half of the 20th century through present day.  
American involvement in foreign aid began with the passage of the European Recovery 
Program, more commonly known as the Marshall Plan, in 1947 after the end of World 
War II.  Between 1948 and 1952, the United States gave $13 billion to 16 European 
countries for reconstruction, which equates to approximately $103.4 billion in current 
year dollars (SIGAR, 2014).  From 1952 to 1961, the United States continued providing 
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assistance around the world, and in 1961 the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) was established with the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act.  
While USAID is the primary agency within the federal government responsible for 
foreign assistance, the U.S. military is also permitted to execute various humanitarian 
assistance programs.  Additionally, many other elements of the executive branch have 
been involved in humanitarian assistance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003.  
A brief description of each of these major civilian and military humanitarian assistance 
programs is provided in further detail in this section. 
Civilian Agency Foreign Assistance 
The Department of State (DoS), through the Director of Foreign Assistance 
(DFA), is the lead coordinator within the federal government for foreign assistance.  
USAID is the lead agency within the federal government responsible for executing 
economic development, health, governance, and disaster relief programs, while DoS is 
the lead agency for executing law enforcement, counter-terrorism, democracy promotion, 
refugee relief, counter-proliferation, and UN-led peacekeeping operations (CRS, 2011).  
The DFA has categorized all foreign assistance programs funded by DoS and USAID 
budgets into five major program areas: Peace and Security, Investing in People, 
Governing Justly and Democratically, Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity, and 
Humanitarian Assistance.  These programs are funded through three main budget 
accounts: Assistance Serving Development and Humanitarian Purposes, Assistance 
Serving Both Development and Special Political/Strategic Purposes, and Assistance 
Serving Security Purposes (CRS, 2011).  While these accounts help organize programs 
and funding, the current structure makes it difficult to determine the exact amounts of 
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money spent on humanitarian assistance by  civilian functions of the federal government.  
All military humanitarian assistance considered in this research is funded through 
Department of Defense (DoD) accounts, which is not tracked through DFA accounts.  In 
total, these accounts were funded at $39.4 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, which 
included $1.9B in Food Aid that is not considered in the previous three accounts (CRS, 
2011).  
Department of Defense Foreign Assistance 
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) is an appropriation 
for DoD that funds Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Foreign Disaster Response (FDR), 
and transportation of donated humanitarian supplies to a foreign location.  HA operations 
are diverse and varied, ranging from supporting internally displaced personnel or 
refugees, to providing security for storage and distribution of relief materials, providing 
technical assistance such as repairing communications infrastructure, and training 
personnel in procedures for demining operations.  FDR missions are designated to 
“alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims, including victims of natural disasters 
and conflicts, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, stateless persons, and 
vulnerable migrants,” and are authorized operations only if military capabilities are 
unique or local civilian capability to respond has been overwhelmed (JP 3-29, 2014).  
DoD has spent $328.4 million between fiscal years 2005 and 2010 on these operations in 
every geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility (AOR), with the highest 
amount spent in U.S. Southern Command (GAO, 2012).  A graph of these total amounts 
from 2005 through 2010 is shown in Figure 3 (GAO, 2012). 
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Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) is a program specifically authorized by 
Title 10, USC, Section 401, which authorizes DoD to execute humanitarian projects as 
deployment training in a foreign country.  These activities are limited to medical 
assistance in areas where services are not available, construction of surface transportation 
systems, construction of basic sanitation facilities, and construction or repair of public 
facilities (JP 3-29, 2014).  DoD has been heavily engaged in these operations, spending 
$75.1 million from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 in all geographic combatant 
commands’ AORs except US Northern Command, with the highest amount spent within 
U.S. Southern Command (GAO, 2012).  An example of an HCA program is Operation 
NEW HORIZONS 2014, which occurred from April to June 2014 in Belize and is the 
source of survey data for this research.  A graph of these total amounts from 2005 
through 2010 is included in Figure 3 (GAO, 2012). 
 While the US military has been heavily involved in spending money and 
executing projects through the OHDACA and HCA programs, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) has been critical of its project evaluation process.  DoD instructions 
mandate an after-action review within 30 days of completion of each OHDACA project, 
and all projects valued at over $10 thousand require another evaluation one year after 
completion; however, the GAO found that 53% of completed projects did not have an 
after-action review, and 90% of projects over $10 thousand did not have a one-year 
evaluation (GAO, 2012).  While some of the lack of project evaluations can be attributed 
to funding and logistical challenges tied to traveling to these locations, DoD also 
indicated that it is difficult to assess the impact of humanitarian assistance projects 
(GAO, 2012).  The GAO identified resources from RAND and the Sphere Project as 
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starting points for the development of these metrics, and cited USAID performance 
measurement planning as a method for assessment (GAO, 2012). 
  
 
Figure 3: OHDACA and HCA Funding from 2005-2010 (Adapted from GAO, 2012) 
 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
The origins of CERP can be traced to the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
when US Forces recovered Ba’ath Party funds and executed emergency projects with this 
cash.  Within two months of the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) in April of 2003, Ambassador Paul Bremer authorized coalition forces to use these 
funds through the newly-named CERP for commanders to “respond to urgent 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, 
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by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the 
reconstruction of Iraq.”  Further guidance from coalition commanders were promulgated 
in fragmentary orders within a few days, which allowed commanders to execute projects 
including “the building, repair, reconstitution, and reestablishment of the social and 
material infrastructure in Iraq” (Martins, 2005).  Initial limitations on these projects 
restricted project approval levels to $100 thousand for colonels and $500 thousand for 
major generals; furthermore, coalition forces were prohibited from using these funds on 
projects that benefited coalition forces, to purchase weapons or ammunition, or pay 
salaries of government employees.  Despite these restrictions, the CERP account 
exhausted Ba’ath Party funding quickly and required $180 million in Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) funding from the $87 billion emergency supplemental funding bill 
signed into law on November 6, 2003 (Martins, 2005).  At this point, CERP had 
transitioned from an Iraqi-funded to federally-funded program.  By the time that U.S. 
forces had left Iraq in December 2011, U.S. forces had executed over 36,000 CERP 
projects at a cost of $3.7 billion (SIGIR, 2013a). 
Numerous reports by SIGIR have been critical about project and contract 
management of CERP projects in Iraq.  The governing guidance for the use of CERP 
funds was titled “Money as a Weapon System” (MAAWS), which mandated project 
milestone and financial status tracking for projects.  MAAWS also mandated 
coordination with USAID and Government of Iraq officials in response to criticism that 
DoD was not defining project requirements frequently enough with all stakeholders.  The 
initial intent of CERP was to fund small, swift projects for urgent humanitarian needs; 
through 2010, there were over 16,000 CERP projects each under $25 thousand and 744 
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projects each costing in excess of $500 thousand dollars (SIGIR,2013a).  Some large 
projects were attempted in which the timeline for the project surpassed the project 
manager’s departure date; for example, 46 projects worth $35.5 million were executed at 
Baghdad International Airport over the course of 4 years by Civil Affairs personnel 
deployed for 6 to 9 months at a time, which resulted in only 22 projects evaluated as 
successful (SIGIR, 2013a).   While program management was a challenge, it was also 
cited in reports that goals and outcomes were poorly defined for many projects.  Goals 
were arbitrarily selected and metrics to judge progress or success were often absent 
(SIGIR, 2013a). 
CERP was authorized in both Afghanistan and Iraq starting in FY 2004.  In both 
theaters, the intent was to address urgent humanitarian relief requirements through small, 
quick projects in specific categories, with prohibitions on using the funds for the benefit 
of coalition forces (SIGAR, 2009).  Unlike in Iraq, CERP in Afghanistan was always an 
appropriation of federal funding.  Similar to the experience in Iraq, reports are critical 
about the management of projects.  US forces have spent $3.7 billion through CERP in 
Afghanistan from 2004 through July 2014 (SIGAR, 2014).   
Other U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance Programs in Iraq 
In addition to CERP, the US government spent $25.7 billion in humanitarian 
assistance from 2003 through the end of 2011.  Of this total, $20.9 billion was spent 
through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and $4.8 billion was spent through the 
Economic Support Fund (SIGIR, 2013a).  Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects 
were primarily executed by the Department of Defense and consisted of two separate 
programs, funded at $2.5 billion and $18.4 billion, which focused on infrastructure 
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projects in 12 critical sectors including electricity, oil, healthcare, transportation, 
education, and security.  The Economic Support Fund was funded by the Departments of 
State, Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, the Treasury, as well as USAID, with the focus on 
economic development, job creation, community security, democracy promotion, and 
transitioning the Iraqi economy away from state-owned enterprises (SIGIR, 2013b).  
These totals do not include funds spent on Iraqi Security Forces or on law enforcement 
operations, which are counted as reconstruction efforts, but not directly associated with 
humanitarian assistance.  
Other U.S. Government Humanitarian Assistance Programs in Afghanistan 
Excluding CERP, there are three major humanitarian assistance funds in 
Afghanistan, with a total of $19.5 billion spent from 2002 to 2014.  Of this total, $17.5 
billion was spent on political, economic, and security priorities through the USAID-
funded Economic Support Fund.  Additionally, the Department of Defense spent $1.2 
billion on large-scale public infrastructure projects through the Afghanistan Infrastructure 
Fund; it spent another $0.8 billion on financial sector and banking reforms through the 
Task Force for Business and Stability Operations.  In total, these programs dwarf the $3.7 
billion in CERP funding over the same time period (SIGAR, 2014).  These totals do not 
include funds spent on counter-narcotics operations, law enforcement operations, or the 
Afghan Security Forces.  These activities are considered reconstruction efforts, but 
should be considered separate from humanitarian assistance. 
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Doctrine Background 
US military forces can be employed throughout a wide spectrum of operations at 
any location in the world.  These operations range from peacetime operations in a 
friendly country, to stability operations in a troubled nation, and ultimately in combat 
operations in enemy territory.  The continuum of military operations as accepted by US 
military joint doctrine is illustrated in Figure 4 (JP 3-0, 2011).  While US military forces 
are trained, organized, and equipped primarily for combat operations, these forces could 
be called upon to execute operations anywhere within this continuum. 
 
 
Figure 4: The Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0, 2011) 
 
Humanitarian assistance operations can be expected to be executed throughout the 
range of military operations.  The type and scale of humanitarian operations can be 
expected to differ based on the amount of conflict in the Area of Responsibility (AOR)  
of the operation; for example, crisis response operations may have a large humanitarian 
assistance component, but depending on the situation in the objective country there could 
be no combat operations.  These operations are categorized on the range illustrated in 
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Figure 4, with elements of humanitarian assistance possible at each level dependent on 
where the operation lies on the conflict continuum (JP 3-0, 2011).  This section will first 
discuss the overall Joint Operations Process, with further discussions of peace operations, 
stability operations, and COIN operations as elements of doctrine at different locations 
along the conflict continuum.  The section will conclude with a discussion on operations 
assessments and their use in humanitarian assistance. 
The Joint Operations Process 
The joint operations process is a framework that outlines how the U.S. military 
executes across the range of military operations.  These operations could be anything 
from peacetime humanitarian assistance projects to a major theater war.  For many of 
these various operations, there will be an element of civil-military operations where 
military personnel interface with governmental organizations and the civilian population 
in order to achieve military objectives and maximize civilian support for operations (JP 
3-0, 2011).  These civil-military operations may occur in any phase during the operations 
process shown in Figure 5 (JP 3-0, 2011); in particular, civil-military operations 
involving humanitarian assistance projects should be expected to be heavy during Phases 
0, I, IV, and V. 
   
  
 
1
6
 
 
Figure 5: Operations Phases and Military Effort (JP 3-0, 2011)
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Stability Operations 
The U.S. military has been heavily involved in stability operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan since 2001, which consist of operations outside of the U.S. to “maintain or 
reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, 
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (JP 3-07, 2011).  While 
both Iraq and Afghanistan have been considered major COIN operations, the proper 
doctrine terms dictate that the “build” portion of COIN is a stability operation (JP 3-07, 
2011).  As such, stability operations can consist of heavy humanitarian assistance and 
infrastructure investment efforts.  The core mission of stabilization operations is to build 
the legitimacy of the host nation government in the opinion of the host nation population 
(JP 3-07, 2011).  While U.S. civilian agencies such as USAID and USACE should lead 
the execution of major infrastructure projects to restore essential services to the 
population, U.S. military doctrine specifies that military units can be tasked to execute 
quick impact projects as part of a multi-agency team such as Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs).  U.S military doctrine also cites CERP in Iraq and Afghanistan as an 
example of how to implement economic development initiatives (JP 3-07, 2011). 
Stability operations are intended to build the legitimacy of the host nation 
government as seen by the host nation population, yet the assessment guidance in U.S. 
military doctrine emphasizes Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) that measure the change 
in a citizen’s life rather than their perception of their government and references metrics 
such as reductions in violence and improvement of public utility performance as 
examples (JP 3-07, 2011).  Detailed assessment tools have been developed for specific 
  
18 
assessment purposes; for example, the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework tool 
is used to determine the groups involved and drivers of conflict, whereas the District 
Stability Framework is a tool used to determine the root cause of instability and identify 
means to address those causes (JP 3-07, 2011).  There are four assessment tools listed in 
JP 3-07, but the only tool that takes into account the perception of the population is the 
District Stability Framework. 
COIN Operations 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been conducted by the U.S. military 
extensively in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and the Horn of Africa since 2001.  
COIN operations are a combined political and military effort where the legitimacy of the 
government as viewed by the population is the objective (JP 3-24, 2013).  JP 3-24 states 
that the authority to govern is dependent on four factors:  
 Mandate. The perceived legitimacy of the mandate that establishes a state 
authority, whether through the principles of universal suffrage, a recognized 
or accepted caste/tribal model, or authoritarian rule. 
 Manner. The way in which those exercising that mandate conduct themselves, 
both individually and collectively in meeting the expectations of the local 
population(s). 
 Support and Consent. The extent to which local populations consent to, or 
comply with, the manner/authority of those exercising the mandate. Consent 
may range from active support, passive support, or indifference, through 
unwilling compliance. 
 Expectations. The relative quality or amount of support that local populations 
expect from their government.  
COIN is a comprehensive approach to building the legitimacy of the host nation 
government through information, security, and economic activities executed through a 
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political strategy (JP 3-24, 2013).  In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the “Shape, Clear, Hold, 
Build, Transition” operations scheme was used for COIN.  This method saw extensive 
use of infrastructure investment in the “Build” and “Transition” phases as part of the U.S. 
military strategy, which could also be considered stability operations.  The security 
activities of COIN secure the conditions for economic, political, and social improvements 
by the host nation government such as restoring rule of law, providing essential services, 
and rebuilding economic systems (JP 3-24, 2013).  The complex relationships of these 
factors resulted in the development of a system dynamics diagram shown in Figure 6, 
which was leaked to the press in 2010, where General Stanley McChrystal, then 
Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), commented “When 
we understand that slide, we’ll have won the war” (Bumiller, 2010). 
Operations assessments are vital to every military operation, but COIN doctrine 
stresses that the understanding of the COIN operational environment requires continuous 
assessment in order to detect changing conditions (JP 3-24, 2013).  JP 3-24 includes an 
extensive 18-page long chapter dedicated to assessing COIN operations, which is 
considerably more than the previously mentioned doctrine documents.  While this seems 
extensive, the operations assessments process is focused on definitions and types of 
inputs and outputs rather than suggesting ways to collect data.  Despite COIN being a 
population-centric strategy, there is no specific mention of surveys of the population 
during operations assessments. 
  
2
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Figure 6: Afghanistan Stability / COIN System Dynamics Chart (Bumiller, 2010) 
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Operations Assessments 
According to U.S. military doctrine, operations assessments should start during 
the initial planning stages of the operations process and continue throughout execution.  
These assessments provide data to commanders to determine progress towards defined 
objectives and provide vital information for decisions (JP 3-0, 2011).  These assessments 
use Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), which assess the overall change in a system, and 
Measures of Performance (MOP), which indicate specific task performance (JP 3-29, 
2014).  While doctrine documents focus on defining these terms, they fall short on 
providing guidance in how to actually perform operations assessments (Schroden, 2011).  
As presented in the COIN Doctrine section, COIN guidance does not mention using 
population surveys to determine their perception of their own government.   
Assessments of whether the U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were 
winning or losing was difficult to accomplish and widely criticized (Schroden, 2011).  
Some critics have cited improper metrics, but Schroden identified five factors in his 
“Failure Cycle for Operations Assessment,” with poor doctrine, inadequate training, poor 
processes and products, commander disinterest, and lack of advocacy listed as the links in 
a chain causing failure.  
Poor and confusing doctrine leads (in part) to inadequate (or no) training 
of assessment practitioners, which leads to poor assessment processes and 
products, which leads to commanders who are uninterested in assessment, 
which leads to a lack of advocacy for fixing assessment, which leads to a 
perpetuation of poor doctrine – and the cycle continues. (Schroden, 2011) 
 
In the case of infrastructure investment in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it could be argued 
that doctrine did not provide adequate assessment guidance since COIN does not mention 
population surveys despite being a population-centric strategy.  The lack of this data left 
 22 
a key variable unmeasured in COIN assessment such that training of the assessors may 
have been irrelevant, but the omission of population perception survey data likely 
resulted in an assessment product that did not measure the progress towards the ultimate 
objective in a COIN operation. 
Operations assessments are not limited to combat operations.  By law, the U.S. 
military must conduct an after-action review or project evaluation on all OHDACA 
projects within 30 days of project completion and again a year after completion; however, 
from FY2005 to FY2009, 53% of surveyed projects did not have a 30-day evaluation 
accomplished and over 90% did not have a 1-year evaluation (GAO, 2012).  The GAO 
also criticized the U.S. military for using inconsistent evaluation of HCA projects and for 
executing projects that did not meet host country needs (GAO, 2012).   
 
Impact of Humanitarian Assistance and Foreign Aid 
The impact of humanitarian assistance and foreign aid is a controversial subject.  
Core to the assessment of the impact of humanitarian assistance or foreign aid is defining 
the intended effect.  During the Cold War, the U.S. used foreign aid as a tool to spread 
democracy, but little evidence exists to prove that this aid had a significant impact on 
recipient nations’ progress towards democracy.  Analysis indicates that progress towards 
democracy is often offset by a country’s dependence on aid which also results in a 
government becoming less accountable to their citizens but rather to their aid donors 
(Knack, 2004).  Others argue that variables such as the style of government and the 
breadth of distribution of wealth within a country influence progress towards 
democratization upon a dictator receiving foreign aid (Wright, 2009). 
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Several studies have been conducted studying the effect of CERP spending in Iraq 
and Afghanistan on violence levels.  An analysis of 2,000 CERP records in the 
Afghanistan project database reported less than 10% of those projects identified violence 
reduction as an intended outcome (Fischerkeller, 2011).  Many respondents to a survey 
conducted by SIGIR of personnel involved with CERP in Iraq reported that reduction in 
violence was the intended impact; however, the intended impact of a project such as 
“increase government capacity” was often not adequately related to the metrics used to 
assess the impact or to the actual project executed (Bowen & Collier, 2013).   
Data from Iraq supported a model for determining the impact of CERP project 
spending on violence levels, which indicated that “every additional dollar per capita of 
CERP spending predicted 1.59 less violent incidents per 100,000 population per half 
year,” (Berman, Shapiro, Felter, 2011).  The data also supports the conclusion that 
reconstruction spending outside of CERP, which accounted for approximately 90% of the 
funds expensed over the analyzed time period, did not have a violence-reducing effect 
(Berman, Shapiro, Felter, 2011).  Similar results in another study show that the type of 
project executed and a city’s baseline violence level in Iraq influence whether or not 
spending through CERP reduces violence levels.  While many of the results were not 
statistically significant at the p = 0.01 level, the data shows that spending on democracy, 
education, transportation, and water, as well as large projects in general, reduced the per 
capita violence rates in cities with a higher baseline violence level; however, spending in 
lower violence baseline cities on democracy, transportation, and water were the only ones 
that reduced violence (Clark & Jackson, 2013).  The results indicate that smaller projects 
executed at lower levels were more effective at reducing violence in some situations, but 
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it is unclear if the larger projects had an impact on other aspects of COIN and stability 
objectives such as building the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. 
Recent research into stability and international aid is inconclusive on the overall 
effect of assistance in Afghanistan.  In one study, evidence suggests that the large 
amounts of aid being spent enabled corruption and decreased the perception of legitimacy 
of the government and, in some situations, actually increased violence as parties 
competed for aid resources (Fishstein & Wilder, 2012).  In COIN and stability operations, 
the objective is to increase the legitimacy of the government, yet few studies address how 
aid may impact this outcome.  Measuring the impact of aid is difficult, but public opinion 
polling may be a method that has merit.  In many cases, the impact of PRTs has been 
reported in terms of dollars spent and numbers of projects executed; in other cases, the 
metrics of success have been reported in terms of number of smiling children (McNerney, 
2006).  Fishstein and Wilder (2012) caution that western-style polls may be unreliable; 
however, organizations should invest more in measuring outcomes and impacts of aid. 
 
Citizen Satisfaction Research Background 
The discipline of Public Administration focuses in the area of citizen satisfaction 
and has mature models developed to measure citizen satisfaction with government 
services, along with a multitude of other measures such as justice and trust.  Within the 
discipline of Public Administration, there has been a recent synthesis of traditional citizen 
satisfaction theory with consumer expectancy-disconfirmation theory that originated in 
the marketing and business fields (Van Ryzin et al., 2004).  This model has been adapted 
and tested by Van Ryzin, who has published several articles with his results.  The core of 
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his adapted expectation, performance, and citizen satisfaction model compares a citizen’s 
survey ratings of the level of performance of nine city services with their previous 
expectations of level of performance, and then compares this relationship to the citizen’s 
overall satisfaction with government services (Van Ryzin, 2004).   
Van Ryzin’s model as represented in Figure 7 illustrates that citizen expectations 
of government services and perceptions of performance feed into the overall perception 
of disconfirmation.  The citizen’s perceived difference between their expectations and 
perceived performance will either be positive, meaning government services exceeded 
their expectations, or will be negative, meaning government services did not meet their 
expectations.  This disconfirmation variable then drives the citizen’s overall perception of 
satisfaction (Van Ryzin, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 7: Expectancy Disconfirmation Model (Van Ryzin, 2004) 
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Van Ryzin’s first model showed a strong relationship between disconfirmation 
and satisfaction; however, later results determined that the initial model had statistical 
flaws which biased the results (Van Ryzin, 2005).  These flaws were identified and 
modified in later studies by measuring disconfirmation with a survey response instead of 
calculating disconfirmation by subtracting the expectations rating from the performance 
rating.  A new model was tested by Van Ryzin using an online survey sent to 1,631 
people, of which 615 people completed the survey (Van Ryzin, 2005).  The results of this  
survey formed the basis of his 2005 paper which tested three similar models, of which the 
most applicable model appeared to be one with a survey question response for 
disconfirmation.  This differed from the other two models which used a mathematical 
disconfirmation value, and the combination of a mathematical value and survey data, to 
determine citizen satisfaction.  Using the survey-only measure for disconfirmation 
reduced the effect of disconfirmation on satisfaction, but it still accounted for a 
standardized effect of 0.49 on the overall satisfaction rating, with performance 
contributing 0.41 and expectations contributing 0.10 towards this measure as well.  The 
summary model of these results is included in Figure 8, which illustrates that the total 
model explained 75% of the variation of the data (Van Ryzin, 2005). 
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Figure 8: Expectancy Disconfirmation Model Parameter Estimates (Van Ryzin, 2005) 
 
Using this framework, the impact of humanitarian assistance can be assessed by 
measuring the change in citizen satisfaction before and after a humanitarian project is 
executed.  Van Ryzin’s model was developed from research on government services in 
New York City, which will require modification of the measured factors when used in a 
less developed country, as fewer government services are typically available to such a 
population.  Hansen (2015) adapted this framework to measure citizen satisfaction in 
Belize, which formed the basis for this research. 
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Background on Belize 
Belize is a former British Colony in Central America.  Both the British and 
Spanish claimed Belize until 1854 when it was designated British Honduras, and Belize 
was granted independence from the United Kingdom in 1991.  The current population of 
Belize is approximately 340 thousand people and the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) is approximately $1.6 billion per year, which yields a per capita GDP of $8.8 
thousand per citizen (CIA: The World Factbook, 2014).  The largest sector of Belize’s 
economy is tourism, which accounts for 33.2% of the GDP and 30.1% of the employed 
workforce (World Travel & Tourism Council, 2012).  The rest of Belize’s economy 
consists of agricultural exports such as bananas, cacao, citrus, sugar, lumber, and fish, as 
well as industries such as textile manufacturing, oil, and food processing (CIA: The 
World Factbook, 2014).  Figure 9 shows a map of Belize that illustrates locations of 
interest and the geography of the country.  Overall, the country is impoverished with an 
economy based on services, exporting resources, and limited industrial capacity. 
 
 29 
 
Figure 9: Map of Belize (belize.com, 2015) 
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In contrast to these average ratings of government trust, the average rating of 
Belize citizens’ satisfaction with municipal services in 2008 was the third lowest in Latin 
America with a 39.6 satisfaction rating.  The average rating was 49.9 elsewhere in Latin 
America, and the only countries lower than Belize in that study were Haiti and Jamaica, 
at 39.5 and 37, respectively (Montalvo, 2009).  Similar results can be seen over time from 
2008 through 2012 in Figure 10, which was compiled using data from LAPOP’s System 
for Online Data Analysis.  This chart illustrates that less than 20% of Belize citizens have 
a favorable rating of municipal services; low ratings are consistent across several years, 
and the percentage of people rating their municipal services “Poor” or “Very Poor” has 
decreased in the last 4 years (LAPOP, 2014).  These data suggest that the overall level of 
municipal services are lacking in Belize compared to the rest of Latin America, but 
citizens’ trust in government is similar to other countries in the region. 
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Figure 10: Citizen's Perceptions of Local Government Services in Belize, 2008-2012 
(Adapted from LAPOP, 2014) 
 
Another area of interest for this research is the population’s perception of the U.S.  
Recent data indicates that the perception of trust in the U.S. among citizens of Belize is 
rated 48.9 out of 100, which is below the Latin America average of 55.6.  Trust in the 
U.S. was analyzed using regression models which determined that trust ratings are driven 
by trade with the U.S., and many of the countries with the lowest trust ratings in the U.S. 
were located farther away than countries with higher ratings, with the exception of 
Mexico (Silliman, 2014).  While the citizens of Belize have a relatively low level of trust 
in the U.S. despite being geographically close, it should also be noted that the rating of 
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trust in the U.S. of 48.9 is higher than the citizens of Belize’s rating of 47.2 regarding 
trust in their own government. 
In addition to these measures of government services and trust, there is data 
available regarding overall life satisfaction within Latin America.  Like many of the other 
measures previously discussed, Belize rated only 53.4 out of 100, below the average 
rating of 59.5 for Latin America, with only four other countries rating lower than Belize, 
and with Brazil ranked highest at 71.6 in 2010.  Further analysis suggests a link between 
individual wealth, national wealth, and happiness ratings (Corral, 2011).  These data 
appear to show a different picture than the data regarding trust in government, which 
showed ratings close to the average for Latin America, although that data was correlated 
to GDP growth rate per capita.  Further analysis regarding the determinants of 
satisfaction with government services, trust in government, and overall happiness is 
warranted to better understand these relationships. 
 
Operation NEW HORIZONS 14 
The 820th RED HORSE Squadron (RHS) deployed to Belize from April through 
June 2014 in support of Operation NEW HORIZONS 14.  During this deployment, the 
820th RHS executed five construction projects at three locations which had been selected 
prior to this research effort.  These projects ranged in cost from $75 thousand to $204 
thousand each.  Projects included four school additions and one hospital addition, with 
three school projects occurring in Belize City and the other projects occurring in 
Belmopan and Hattieville.  A summary of these projects and locations is included in 
Table 1.  This operation provided an opportunity to gather population survey data before 
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and after the execution of these projects in order to determine the effect of the project on 
the population’s satisfaction with their host nation (HN) government and their perception 
of the U.S. 
 
Table 1: Operation NEW HORIZONS 14 Project Summary 
 
Project Title Location Cost 
Western Regional Hospital Addition Belmopan, Belize  $204,000 
Hattieville Preschool Hattieville, Belize $173,000 
Sadie Vernon School Belize City, Belize $144,000 
Stella Maris School Belize City, Belize $119,000 
Edward P. York School Belize City, Belize   $75,000 
 
Experiment Design 
While both Hansen and this research effort answer distinctly different questions, 
the core research effort shared common survey data collected during Operation NEW 
HORIZONS 14 in Belize.  An experiment was designed to test the effect of a given 
humanitarian project on a population.  The treatment for this experiment is the project 
being executed in a given community.  Because treatments are being executed on existing 
groups as the community population, a quasi-experimental approach using the 
nonequivalent control group design was used to test the hypotheses (Patten, 2009).  A 
diagram of this experimental design is included in Figure 11, with the four school 
projects and one clinic project consisting of the three treatments in this diagram, and a 
sixth control group at the bottom.  Since three of the school projects were executed in 
Belize City, the treatments and observations were combined.  The dashed lines indicate 
that these treatments are being done on existing separate populations of Belmopan, 
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Hattieville, Belize City, and control locations.  Surveys were given before and after the 
treatments to determine the population’s change in satisfaction with government services 
and perception of the U.S. due to the infrastructure investment. 
 
 
 
 
Survey Development 
The population’s satisfaction with government services was measured with a 
survey using the expectancy-disconfirmation model proposed by Van Ryzin (2004).  The 
structure of Van Ryzin’s survey instrument (2005) was used as a basis to develop the 
survey instrument employed at multiple locations across Belize, with additional questions 
included to measure factors not considered in Van Ryzin’s research.  The survey first 
measured the citizen’s top three priority services in a free response format to determine 
the citizen’s priority of services without being prompted by a Likert scale question.  Next, 
the survey collected ratings of expectations, performance, disconfirmation, and 
satisfaction with government services on a 1 to 5 Likert scale, with three questions for 
each measure except performance, which had seven measures.   
The seven performance measures asked citizens to rate the performance of 
schools, health care, local police, garbage removal, quality of drinking water, cleanliness, 
Hospital  O X O 
Preschool  O X O 
School #2 - #4  O X O 
Control  O  O 
 
Figure 11: Experiment Design 
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and quality of roads in their neighborhood.  These measures were selected based on the 
public services available in Belize.  The next section of the survey included a series of 
questions designed to assess the quality of the target selected in that area for diagnostic 
purposes and asked questions unrelated to infrastructure to determine if there is an 
external threat to validity on the results of the satisfaction rating.  The next section asked 
citizens about their perceptions of the U.S. and U.S. military personnel in Belize during 
the exercise.  Finally, the survey concluded with date, location, and demographic 
questions to determine if the number of children, education level, income level, gender, 
or age have an effect on the results.  A summary of the survey questions is included in 
Table 2; the survey instrument itself is included in Appendix A. 
 Latent variables in the expectancy-disconfirmation measures and the perceptions 
of the U.S. measure have multiple survey questions to improve the reliability of the 
survey data.  For the expectations, disconfirmation, and satisfaction measures there are 
three questions each, while the perceptions of the U.S. measure has four questions.  The 
citizen priority measure has three questions and the services measure has eight questions. 
However, each project will only influence one of these measures; therefore, it should not 
be considered a reliability improvement for having multiple questions.  Similarly, the 
target quality questions are all specific to aspects of the target such as the infrastructure, 
staff, and equipment of these services.  These measured served as a diagnostic to 
determine what aspects of the service are better in their opinion, and will better explain 
the changes before and after the infrastructure improvement is executed at that location.  
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Table 2: Survey Question Structure 
 
Section Measure 
Type of 
Measure 
Number of 
Questions 
Section 1: Priorities Citizen’s Priority of Services Free Response 3 
Section 2: Expectancy - 
Disconfirmation Series 
Expectations 1-5 Likert 3 
Performance 1-5 Likert 8 
Disconfirmation 1-5 Likert 3 
Satisfaction 1-5 Likert 3 
Section 3: Target 
Quality 
Factors of Target Quality 1-5 Likert 4 
Section 4: Perception 
of US 
Citizen’s Perception of US 
due to HA in Area 
1-5 Likert 4 
Section 5: 
Demographics 
Demographics, Location, 
Date 
Free Response 7 
 
Survey Procedure 
Survey data was collected by Belize Defense Forces (BDF) personnel from the 
population before and after each of the five projects was executed.  The official language 
of Belize is English, which negated the requirement for language translation and back-
translation of the survey instrument; however, due to a literacy rate of only 76.8% (CIA: 
The World Factbook, 2014), the survey was designed to be read to the respondent for 
verbal answers to questions with BDF personnel circling answers on paper surveys.  The 
survey results were compared to determine the strength of the statistical difference 
between satisfaction ratings as well as multiple regression analysis to determine the effect 
of the project on the population’s satisfaction.  According to Cohen (1992) and 
anticipating medium-strength effect size for three multiple regression factors and an 
alpha of 0.05, the estimated minimum number of samples per location was 76 both before 
and after each project plus a control set, for a minimum total number of 912 samples for 
the entire project.   
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Anticipated Significance 
This research is intended to develop further understanding of citizen satisfaction 
with government services that may be applied towards a target selection methodology for 
humanitarian assistance projects.  This research may also benefit municipal governments 
by contributing to the body of knowledge by further exploring the influence of 
government service performance on citizen satisfaction.  
 
Overview of Remaining Chapters 
This thesis is in the scholarly article format.  The following chapter is an article 
that contains all of the elements of a thesis; it could be submitted for publication when 
combined with the article written by Hansen.  As an independent chapter, it includes an 
abstract, introduction, background, methodology, and discussion section.  Chapter 3 
concludes this thesis with a discussion of the results and conclusions; it also proposes 
further research opportunities within this topic. 
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II.  Scholarly Article 
 
Abstract 
Assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and foreign aid has 
presented a challenge to personnel tasked with these operations.  Answering the question 
“are we winning hearts and minds” has similarly eluded military personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  This research presents a review of humanitarian assistance and foreign aid 
conducted by the U.S. government and literature on U.S. military doctrine regarding 
humanitarian assistance and infrastructure investment.  The research builds upon 
expectancy disconfirmation theory research to determine the strongest predictors of 
citizen satisfaction with government services.  Case study data was collected in Belize 
before and after a U.S. military humanitarian and civil assistance construction project was 
executed, and this data was analyzed using an expectancy theory model.  The results 
indicate that the model using performance, disconfirmation, and an interaction effect of 
both explains 56% of the variation in citizen satisfaction and proposes a predictive model 
of citizen satisfaction.  This article proposes further research with improvement to the 
survey methods and instrument; it also discusses how the model may not account for an 
unmeasured variable.  Further research is also suggested to determine the relationship of 
time and location on a citizen’s satisfaction rating when considering the impact of a 
humanitarian project. 
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Introduction 
The United States entered the domain of major world aid provider starting with 
the Marshall Plan following World War II.  Since then, the United States has been 
heavily involved in foreign aid and humanitarian assistance to present day.  These aid 
programs are often executed by the Department of State, but the U.S military has taken 
on enormous aid programs since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001.  While 
the goals and means of these programs vary considerably, all share a common deficiency 
in assessing the impact of these aid efforts.  This article will discuss means of U.S. 
humanitarian assistance and foreign aid, methods of assessing the effectiveness of aid, 
and will propose an adaptation of existing citizen satisfaction measures to analyze the 
relationship of performance and disconfirmation on citizen satisfaction.  Results of these 
analyses will be presented and discussed, and further research efforts are proposed. 
 
Background 
The U.S. military has statutory authority to conduct foreign assistance through 
two major appropriations: Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) 
and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).  OHDACA is primarily used for disaster 
response operations, with the military spending $328.4 million between 2005 and 2010.  
By contrast, HCA is used for troop deployment training exercises in foreign countries 
where medical assistance or construction projects are executed, with $75.1 million being 
spent between 2005 and 2010 at various locations around the world (GAO, 2012). 
Following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military undertook the 
much-criticized Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).  This program 
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originated in Iraq and was initially executed with seized Iraqi Ba’ath Party funds on 
emergency humanitarian needs; however, once the Iraqi funds were exhausted, this 
program was then funded with U.S. appropriated funds (Martins, 2005).  By the end of 
the Iraq War in 2011, the U.S. military had executed over 36,000 projects at a total cost 
of $3.7 billion (SIGIR, 2013a).  A similar CERP effort was started in Afghanistan in 
2004, with the key difference being that this program was always resourced through 
appropriated funds, with $3.7 billion spent in Afghanistan through July 2014 (SIGAR, 
2014). 
While CERP represents a large amount of aid, this total is eclipsed by the amount 
of non-military humanitarian assistance programs executed by other U.S. agencies.  The 
U.S. government spent $25.7 billion in Iraq from 2003 through 2011, with $20.9 billion 
spent on critical infrastructure and $4.8 billion spent on economic development (SIGIR, 
2013a).  In Afghanistan, the U.S. has spent $19.5 billion through 2014, with $17.5 billion 
spent on economic development, $1.2 billion on large public infrastructure, and $0.8 
billion on banking sector reforms (SIGAR, 2014).  These programs were executed mainly 
through U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but other agencies such as 
the Departments of State, Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury have all 
participated as well. 
Humanitarian assistance and foreign aid have been used in enormous quantities to 
support the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  The ultimate objective according to U.S military doctrine is to build the 
legitimacy of the host nation government in the opinion of the population (JP 3-24, 
2013).  This is accomplished through providing security to the population in the “Clear” 
 41 
and “Hold” phases of operations, which sets the stage for the “Build” and “Transition” 
phases to start with heavy investment in essential government services, economic 
systems, and infrastructure (JP 3-24, 2013).  Even though the stated goal of these 
operations is to build legitimacy of a government as perceived by their constituents, 
CERP projects were often assessed based on measuring the change in levels of violence 
(Bowen & Collier, 2013) despite less than 10% of projects being identified as intended to 
reduce violence (Fisherkeller, 2011).   
Stability operations are similar to the “Build” and “Transition” phases of a COIN 
operation with a common goal of building the legitimacy of the host nation government 
and are often accompanied by humanitarian assistance and infrastructure investment (JP 
3-07, 2011).  These projects have been executed through CERP and other humanitarian 
and foreign aid programs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in various locations worldwide, but 
most of the data and research is from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  U.S. military 
doctrine recommends using assessment tools such as USAID’s District Stability 
Framework, which uses a variety of analysis and survey data collection to conduct root 
cause analysis of sources of instability and address them accordingly (JP 3-07, 2011).  
This tool can be used to measure population perceptions of the legitimacy of their 
government, but implementation of this process occurred late in the Afghan campaign. 
Assessing the impact of humanitarian projects in peacetime, COIN, and stability 
operation environments is difficult and has been criticized, with some examples citing 
“number of smiling Afghan children” as a measure of effectiveness (McNerney, 2006).  
Research in this area has focused on determining the effect of CERP spending on 
violence levels.  In one study, the per capita spending on projects was linked to reducing 
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the violence rate in Iraq over the studied period (Berman, Shapiro, Felter, 2011), while 
another study  linked the effect of specific project types such as education and water 
improvements to different effect magnitudes and directions on violence rates at a city 
level (Clark & Jackson, 2013).  While the reduction in violence is certainly a metric 
worthy of measurement and analysis in a military operation, it is unlikely that this is the 
best metric for assessing progress towards building the legitimacy of the host nation 
government.   
Similarly, assessing the impacts of peacetime foreign aid is difficult and 
controversial.  Between 2005 and 2009, 53% of executed OHDACA projects were not 
assessed within a month of completion and 90% of projects were not assessed a year 
later.  Additionally, the GAO criticized the lack of measures of effectiveness for HCA 
progress, noting examples such as claims that “vaccinating cattle in Uganda helps 
counterterrorism efforts in Somalia” without evidence of this causation link (GAO, 
2012).  The GAO recommended implementing RAND’s monitoring and evaluation 
process for humanitarian assistance projects; however, this guidance sidesteps the key 
question of how to measure if a project was effective at large-level impacts, but rather 
focuses on project-specific outputs and measures of performance scored by personnel 
executing the project (Haims et al., 2011). 
Project assessments are much more difficult when the objective is to influence a 
population’s perception of their government.  Some HCA operations have objectives to 
gain influence of a host nation and build relationships, but evaluations fall short of 
proving these goals were achieved (GAO, 2012).  Other studies are inconclusive on the 
impact of foreign aid; some authors have argued that providing aid fosters dependence on 
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aid and reduces the accountability of a government to their population (Knack, 2004), 
while others argue that the overall result of foreign aid may result in shifting countries 
from dictatorships to democracy only if certain conditions exist (Wright, 2009).  A study 
from Afghanistan suggests that U.S. aid not only decreased the perception of legitimacy 
of the government in some areas, but it also increased corruption and violence in the 
province as parties feuded over the funds being distributed for projects (Fishstein & 
Wilder, 2012). 
The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) conducted an extensive survey of the 
impact of their aid program at 500 locations within Afghanistan between 2007 and 2011.  
This study concluded that infrastructure projects increase access to utilities and improve 
government services for women, but irrigation and transportation projects do not have a 
significant impact.  The study further states that NSP did not have an impact on economic 
development and that the quality of local governance declines as the power in the village 
shifts from the government to the NSP administration structure.  Finally, the study also 
concluded that NSP temporarily increases the perception of legitimacy of the government 
during project execution, but that perception resets after funds are expended (Beath, 
Christia, Enikolopov, 2013).  The study reinforces the notion that donors, while well-
intentioned and executing quality projects that benefit people, may unintentionally 
subvert an existing government structure they intended to assist. 
Despite extensive experience in humanitarian assistance since 2001, the U.S. 
military still struggles to assess the effectiveness of assistance in building the legitimacy 
of host nation governments.  There are limited examples of personnel conducting surveys 
of a population to determine their perceptions of their government and public services, 
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but many of these surveys lack quantitative elements for analysis.  The absence of these 
quantitative measures has made assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance 
difficult and lacking in rigorous analytical power. 
Citizen satisfaction models present an area to explore for assessing effectiveness 
of humanitarian assistance.  A citizen’s satisfaction with their government may be an 
appropriate measurement to gauge the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance when the 
assistance is in the form of an improvement to a government service or public 
infrastructure.  A model of citizen satisfaction has been developed as an adaptation of 
consumer expectancy theory, from the marketing and business disciplines, to explain 
citizen satisfaction (Van Ryzin et al., 2004).  The model measures a citizen’s 
expectations, performance rating, and overall satisfaction with government services, as 
well as their perceived difference between their expectations and the quality of the 
service, which is termed disconfirmation.  Figure 12 shows Van Ryzin’s model (Van 
Ryzin, et al., 2004).   
 Subsequent studies and tests have confirmed its use in urban U.S. cities.  One of 
the key conclusions is that a survey question rating of disconfirmation is a better method 
for measuring disconfirmation rather than a function of the difference between 
expectations and performance as the result, with the model explaining 75% of the 
variance in the model through a structural equation modeling analysis (Van Ryzin, 2005).  
The strength of this model presents this as a possible method to assess the impact of 
humanitarian projects executed with an intended goal of increasing a population’s 
perception of their host nation government. 
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Figure 12: Citizen Satisfaction Expectancy Disconfirmation Model (Van Ryzin et al., 
2004) 
 
As part of U.S. Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) regional engagement 
strategy, the U.S. military executes HCA projects in selected countries within its area of 
responsibility.  Operation NEW HORIZONS 2014 was executed in Belize from April to 
June 2014 with stated objectives to exercise USSOUTHCOM’s ability to plan and 
execute a deployment of personnel and equipment, as well as build partnerships with host 
nation military personnel.  Among the activities executed included the construction of 
four schools and one clinic in three communities.  These projects ranged in costs from 
$75 thousand to $204 thousand and were executed by the 820th RED HORSE Squadron 
in concert with US Army, US Marine Corps, and Belize Defense Force (BDF) engineer 
units.  While none of the exercise objectives were to build the legitimacy of the 
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government, the exercise presented an opportunity to measure the impact of a 
humanitarian project on a population’s satisfaction with government services. 
Belize is a former British colony in Central America, with a population of 340 
thousand people and an annual Gross Domestic Product of $1.6 billion (CIA: The World 
Factbook, 2014).  The economy is primarily based on tourism and agriculture with 
limited industrial capacity (World Travel & Tourism Council, 2012).  Overall, Belize has 
the 3rd lowest satisfaction with municipal services rating in Latin America, with less than 
20% of citizens rating services favorable (Montalvo, 2009; LAPOP, 2014).  Considering 
this baseline information, it would be expected that on average government services are 
in need of improvement and that improvements may result in higher ratings of citizen 
satisfaction. 
 
Methodology 
Using Van Ryzin’s model and survey instruments as a baseline (Van Ryzin 2004; 
Van Ryzin 2005), a survey was developed to test the impact of a humanitarian project on 
citizen satisfaction using a 1-5 Likert scale.  The results of the survey were analyzed by 
Hansen (2015), who confirmed that effects, except the effect of expectations on 
disconfirmation, were statistically significant.  The conclusion of his research is that the 
model shown in Figure 13 is a valid model for assessing citizen satisfaction with all 
effects confirmed individually.  His model thus formed the basis for this research effort, 
which also used the same survey data set for additional analysis. 
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Figure 13: Citizen Satisfaction Model (Hansen, 2015) 
 
Resampling is a method used to increase the sample size of a limited data set.  By 
randomly selecting a set of values from a given data set and placing these values into a 
new data set, additional samples can be generated.  Each set of values in the original data 
has an equal chance of being selected, and every subsequent resample may select an 
already sampled set of data.  Using this method, it is expected that the values of the larger 
resampled data set will represent the true values of the mean and standard deviation of 
the population.  
Linear regression was used to determine the relationships between the selected 
predictor variables and overall citizen satisfaction.  Regression models were analyzed 
using JMP ® 11 Pro produced by SAS ® using the same data collected and analyzed by 
Hansen (2015).  Regression models included single-factor, multiple factor, and 
interaction effects that were determined to be significant.  These models were analyzed 
for percent of variance explained (R
2) as well as the coefficients of regression (β) for 
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each variable of interest.  These regression models formed the baseline of further analysis 
of the strength of predictor variables and in developing a simulation of the response 
variable, which was defined as citizen satisfaction.  Regression analysis was conducted 
on both the baseline survey data collected as well as the resampled data using the 
resampling methodology previously discussed. 
Dominance analysis is a method used to determine the importance of predictor 
variables on the overall regression relationship.  While regression coefficients can 
indicate the strength of the predictor on the outcome, this analysis can be problematic 
when predictors are correlated or even collinear (Tonidandel & LeBreton, 2011).  A 
method introduced by Budescu in 1993 analyzes the change in the R
2
 of a model by 
incrementally including each predictor into the model and ranks the predictors in 
importance (Budescu, 1993).  Using this core method, Dominance Analysis has been 
refined and a method of pair-wise comparisons of the influence of each variable is 
conducted in order to determine which predictor has the greatest effect on explaining 
variance in the model (Azen & Budescu, 2003).  This method was selected for use in this 
analysis due to the nature of the correlations of the predictor variables. 
Additive regression modeling was used to explore the relationship and effects of 
the predictor variables on citizen satisfaction.  The results of the regression analysis 
provided regression coefficients and an intercept which were used to build a prediction 
model for citizen satisfaction based on the most dominant predictors.  Using this formula, 
various “scenarios” were developed based on the possible situations that could be 
encountered based on possible answers on a 1-5 Likert scale.  The scenario analysis used 
these values of the selected predictors to determine a value for citizen satisfaction.   
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Results 
Resampling analysis was conducted on the survey data.  Table 3 shows that the 
summary descriptive statistics of the resampling data set were almost identical to the 
actual data and, as expected, did not yield significantly different results.  Similar analysis 
was conducted on the data attempting to decompose the data into smaller subsets, but the 
results for all cases were identical to the original sample.  These additional tables are 
included in Appendix D.     
 
Table 3: Comparison of Original and Resampled Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Original Data, n = 627 Resampled Data, n = 10,000 
Variable E P D Sat E P D Sat 
Mean 4.50 2.96 2.87 2.58 4.50 2.95 2.87 2.57 
Median 4.67 2.88 3.00 2.33 4.67 2.88 3.00 2.33 
Std Dev 0.62 0.75 0.93 0.96 0.62 0.74 0.93 0.96 
E = Expectation, P = Performance, D = Disconfirmation, Sat = Citizen Satisfaction 
 
Building on the results from Hansen (2015), all variables were confirmed to be 
significant predictors of citizen satisfaction individually and were tested in an additive 
regression model.  These results are listed in Table 4.  While the initial research into these 
relationships indicated that all variables were significant, not all variables remained 
significant when all variables were considered in a single additive regression model.  The 
predictor of expectations became insignificant at the p = 0.05 level, and the intercept of 
the regression equation was also insignificant.  Of note is that the mean of citizen 
satisfaction from the Hansen survey data was 2.576, which is similar to the results of the 
LAPOP data (2014). 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Hansen Model, R
2
 = 0.565 
 
Predictor 
Mean 
(µ) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Regression 
Coefficient 
(β) 
p-Value 
Intercept - - 0.032 0.8798 
Expectation 4.503 0.622 -0.061 0.1348 
Performance 2.956 0.745 0.566 <0.0001 
Disconfirmation 2.866 0.929 0.380 <0.0001 
Centered 
Performance  - 
Disconfirmation 
Interaction 
0.437 0.797 0.139 <0.0001 
Satisfaction 2.576 0.957 - - 
 
Upon inspection of the regression coefficients listed in Table 4, it would appear 
that performance is the largest influencer of citizen satisfaction, with disconfirmation 
being the second largest influencer.  However, this can be misleading as analysis based 
only upon inspection of regression coefficients may be inaccurate when variables are 
correlated.  The correlation between all variables is presented in Table 5, which illustrates 
correlation coefficients greater than 0.6 between citizen satisfaction and both 
performance and disconfirmation, as well as between performance and disconfirmation.  
Due to the nature of the correlations between predictor variables, it is appropriate to 
analyze these predictors through a dominance analysis. 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation Table of Variables 
 
 Expectation Performance Disconfirmation Satisfaction 
Expectation 1.000 - - - 
Performance -0.022 1.000 - - 
Disconfirmation -0.069 0.632* 1.000 - 
Satisfaction -0.064 0.684* 0.658* 1.000 
* Correlation is significant at p < 0.0001 
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The citizen satisfaction data were analyzed using the dominance analysis method 
pioneered by Budescu (1993), with the results being presented in Table 6.  The 
dominance of the predictors can be determined from the differences in R
2
 of each model.  
In each of the models where a single predictor is used, the R
2
 of that value accounts for 
the contribution of that predictor, which is indicated in the first row of Table 6 in the row 
titled “k = 0 Average.”  Similarly, for each row in the table, the contribution of the 
predictor is calculated by taking the value of the R
2
 from the model where each predictor 
of that row plus the predictor of that column is included, and then the value of the R
2
 for 
the model of that row is subtracted from it.  For each category of k, the contribution from 
each predictor is averaged.  The final row shows all of the predictors included in the 
model, thus the cells for each predictor in that row are empty.  The General Dominance 
row represents the average of all of the k averages for that predictor.  To calculate the 
Rescaled Dominance, the General Dominance of that predictor is divided by the sum of 
the General Dominance values for all predictors and multiplied by 100% to represent the 
percentage of R
2
 change that the predictor contributed to the full model. 
As presented in Table 6, performance is the largest contributor to R
2
 in the models 
tested, with disconfirmation also being close.  These two predictors together account for 
94% of the change in R
2
 in the models, but the interaction of performance and 
disconfirmation only accounts for 5.38% of the change in R
2
.  Furthermore, the 
contribution of expectation to these models is minimal, with one instance of expectation 
decreasing R
2
 when added to the model with disconfirmation.  While the best R
2
 of these 
tested models was 0.565 with all four predictors included, the additional contribution of 
expectation only increased the model R
2
 by 0.001. 
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Table 6: Dominance Analysis of Predictors of Citizen Satisfaction 
 
Model Model R
2
 
Additional Contribution of: 
X1 X2 X3 X4 
k = 0 Average  0.002 0.467 0.433 0.033 
X1 0.002  0.466 0.430 0.036 
X2 0.467 0.002  0.085 0.016 
X3 0.433 -0.001 0.119  0.015 
X4 0.033 0.005 0.450 0.414  
k = 1 Average  0.002 0.467 0.433 0.033 
X1X2 0.468   0.083 0.018 
X1X3 0.432  0.120  0.132 
X1X4 0.039  0.448 0.409  
X2 X3 0.552 0.000   0.013 
X2X4 0.483 0.003  0.081  
X3X4 0.448 0.000 0.117   
k = 2 Average  0.001 0.228 0.191 0.054 
X1X2X3 0.552    0.013 
X1X2X4 0.486   0.079  
X1X3X4 0.448  0.117   
X2X3X4 0.564 0.001    
k = 3 Average  0.001 0.117 0.079 0.013 
X1X2X3X4 0.565     
General 
Dominance 
 
0.002 0.289 0.253 0.031 
Rescaled 
Dominance 
 
0.275% 50.3% 44.0% 5.38% 
X1 = Expectation, X2 = Performance, X3 = Disconfirmation, X4 = Centered Interaction 
of Performance and Disconfirmation, and k = Number of Predictor Variables in 
Model 
 
 
With the conclusion that performance, disconfirmation, and the interaction of 
performance and disconfirmation contribute the most to explaining variance in citizen 
satisfaction, a new model was developed and tested.  This new model did not include 
expectation as a predictor variable.  The descriptive statistics for this model are included 
in Table 7.  While the values for the regression coefficients did not change substantially 
for the predictor variables, the intercept value changed and became statistically 
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significant at the p = 0.05 level.  This model is therefore more statistically accurate, 
although the R
2
 of the model is still only 0.564, and returning a statistically-significant 
value for an intercept enabled a more accurate prediction model for citizen satisfaction. 
Using these values, an additive regression prediction formula was built using Equation 1, 
where Y = citizen satisfaction, βn = regression coefficient, Xn = value of prediction 
variable, and μn = mean of prediction variable. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of New Model, R
2
 = 0.564 
 
Predictor Variable 
Mean 
(µ) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Regression 
Coefficient 
(β) 
p-Value 
Intercept - - - -0.248 0.0187 
Performance X1 2.956 0.745 0.566 <0.0001 
Disconfirmation X2 2.866 0.929 0.380 <0.0001 
Centered 
Performance – 
Disconfirmation 
Interaction 
X3 0.437 0.797 0.139 <0.0001 
 
 
Equation 1 
(1)  
 
Using Equation 1, the predicted values of citizen satisfaction were calculated for 
each set of actual values for performance and disconfirmation.  The predicted values of 
citizen satisfaction plotted versus the actual survey values are presented in Figure 14.  
Since the measure of actual citizen satisfaction was an average of three questions on a 1-5 
Likert scale, these data points cluster in increments of 0.33 along the x-axis.  In some 
cases, a respondent did not answer all three satisfaction measures, which resulted in an 
average of two values and thus returned some values in increments of 0.5.  In two cases, 
0 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2( )( )Y X X X X          
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the predicted value of satisfaction exceeded the maximum possible value of 5 on the 
survey instrument.  If the prediction model were a perfect fit with a R
2
 of 1.0, the data 
points would form a straight line upwards from the origin at a 45-degree angle; however, 
this model only had an R
2
 of 0.564, which resulted in significant variation in the 
predicted data points. 
 To further explore the relationships of performance and disconfirmation on citizen 
satisfaction, Equation 1 was used to develop a scenario based on values of performance 
and expectation.  The prediction formula was used to determine the predicted value of 
citizen satisfaction for both values of predictor variables.  This analysis is presented in 
Table 8, with each possible value of disconfirmation represented by column, each 
possible value of performance by row, and the expected value of citizen satisfaction for 
each column and row combination of predictors in the individual cells.  The results show 
that the rating of citizen satisfaction increases much faster as values of performance 
increase versus the values of disconfirmation.  For example, citizen satisfaction only 
increases by 1.54 as disconfirmation increases from 1 to 5 when performance stays at 3, 
whereas satisfaction increases by 2.34 as performance increases from 1 to 5 and 
disconfirmation remains at 3.  The value of 3 is closest to the mean of both predictor 
variables, which results in the interaction of the predictors having the smallest effect on 
satisfaction. 
Overall, these results present the possibility that citizen satisfaction may be 
predicted given performance and disconfirmation, but the results are vulnerable to error.  
The R
2
 of the model was only 0.564, which resulted in wide variation in the predicted 
results compared to the actual values of citizen satisfaction.   
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Figure 14: Predicted vs. Actual Citizen Satisfaction 
 
 
Table 8: Scenario Analysis of Citizen Satisfaction 
 
 Disconfirmation Value 
1 2 3 4 5 
P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 
V
a
lu
e 
1 1.21 1.31 1.42 1.53 1.64 
2 1.51 1.76 2.01 2.25 2.50 
3 1.82 2.21 2.59 2.98 3.36 
4 2.13 2.65 3.18 3.70 4.23 
5 2.43 3.10 3.76 4.43 5.00 
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Discussion 
The methodology and results of this analysis partially confirm the models 
developed by Van Ryzin (2004) and tested by Hansen (2015); however, the effect of 
expectations on both disconfirmation and citizen satisfaction was not supported.  Using 
the revised model, it is possible to predict citizen satisfaction given performance and 
disconfirmation data; however, this prediction comes with a wide prediction interval of 
approximately ±1.25, which makes it difficult to accurately predict satisfaction using a 1-
5 Likert scale. 
The results of this research can be improved with some changes survey execution 
methodology.  Survey data collection was originally intended to be conducted using BDF 
personnel interviewing citizens of Belize, with BDF personnel recording the answers to 
surveys and the location of collection.  The situation during the early portion of the 
exercise necessitated these surveys be distributed in print to BDF personnel to distribute 
to their home towns prior to an extended leave period in conjunction with Easter; in turn, 
many BDF personnel handed out paper copies of the survey for citizens to fill out, 
resulting in missing data, multiple Likert scale selections per measure, and various other 
data irregularities.  This approach was also problematic considering that although the 
official language in Belize is English, only 3.9% of the population listed English as their 
language in the 2000 census, with the largest percentages of language being Spanish at 
46% and Creole at 33%.  Additionally, the country’s adult literacy rate is 77% (CIA: The 
World Factbook, 2014).  These factors may bring into question the validity of the survey 
data and by extension the overall results. 
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Another improvement to survey methodology is in the collection of surveys with 
respect to the areas of interest.  In the initial round of surveys, only 56 of 172 useable 
surveys were collected from locations where a project was executed; in the following 
round, 247 of 455 useable surveys were collected from two of the three locations where a 
project was executed (Hansen, 2015).  The lack of a sufficient number of surveys from 
the initial round limited the ability to compare the results before and after a project was 
executed.  The survey collection also combined all non-project location survey data into a 
control group for analysis; however, this resulted in wide variation in the data that could 
be explained by location-specific issues, and some locations were not represented in both 
survey rounds.  Future survey research should attempt to collect survey data in sufficient 
numbers from project locations, and should designate a specific control location for 
sampling. 
The timing of survey collection was also problematic.  Four of the projects 
executed were schools and surveys were collected initially in April and again in June.  
However, the citizens in the area around these schools are unlikely to have noticed any 
substantial change in government services as the children that normally attend these 
schools were on summer vacation during the June survey period.  A citizen would likely 
not have an informed judgment on quality of school service until after schools reopened 
sometime in the fall of 2015.  In the meantime, it is possible that the noise, dust, and 
truck traffic that accompanied construction of the schools may have irritated local 
citizens, resulting in biased survey data.  Data fidelity can be improved by sampling 
citizens in the area around these project locations at a later time after construction and 
after school has returned to session. 
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Aside from survey execution issues, it is possible that citizen satisfaction may be 
influenced by another unmeasured variable.  Expectation was shown to be an 
insignificant predictor, but the model only explained 56% of the variation in citizen 
satisfaction.  Data from previous research indicates that Belize has a low rating of trust in 
government compared to other Latin American countries (LAPOP, 2014).  This may 
indicate that trust in government, as well as other factors such as perceived justice, may 
influence a citizen’s satisfaction judgment with government services. 
 
Conclusion 
This research presents a method for predicting citizen satisfaction.  While the 
overall accuracy of the results leave room for improvement, it is possible that 
improvements in survey deployment and collection timelines may improve these results.  
This method may be useful in a stability or COIN operations for determining a 
population’s baseline level of citizen satisfaction with government services.  This 
information may help guide selection of humanitarian projects to address the needs of a 
population and improve their rating of satisfaction with their government.  Additionally, 
this model and method may be useful in municipalities within the U.S. in selecting where 
to invest in public infrastructure. 
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III.  Results and Conclusion 
 
Research Questions Revisited 
This research posed the problem of how to measure the effectiveness of a 
humanitarian project.  The research applied citizen satisfaction models and statistical 
analysis techniques to evaluate a method for assessing citizen satisfaction in conjunction 
with a humanitarian assistance project.  Results have been processed and the research 
questions can now be explicitly addressed: 
 
Can satisfaction be predicted when the expectations of the population is known?  
Initial results from Van Ryzin (2004, 2005) and Hansen (2015) indicated that 
expectation is a weak predictor of citizen satisfaction.  Through regression and 
dominance analysis, it appears that citizen satisfaction cannot be predicted based on 
known expectations.  Furthermore, expectation had an insignificant effect when 
combined in a model with performance and disconfirmation.  
 
Can satisfaction be predicted when the population’s rating of government service 
performance is known? 
Results from previous research suggest that performance is a strong predictor of 
citizen satisfaction (Van Ryzin, 2005).  When performance is selected as the only 
predictor of citizen satisfaction, the analysis results in an R
2
 of 0.467; the model is 
responsible for 50.3% of the explained variance in regression analysis with additional 
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predictors.  While performance is the strongest predictor of citizen satisfaction, it should 
be further combined with other factors to improve prediction accuracy. 
 
Can satisfaction be predicted when the difference between the population’s 
expectations and perception of government services performance is known?  
Results from previous research suggest that the difference between the 
population’s expectations and perception of performance, also termed disconfirmation, is 
the strongest predictor of citizen satisfaction (Van Ryzin, 2005).  The result from this 
analysis suggest that disconfirmation, while a strong predictor with an R
2
 of 0.433 when 
considered alone, is not as strong as performance but still accounted for 44.0% of the 
explained variance in regression analysis.  These results suggest that disconfirmation is a 
good predictor, but it should also be considered with other factors to improve prediction 
accuracy. 
 
Which factors are most influential on citizen satisfaction?  
According to this analysis, the most influential factors on citizen satisfaction are 
performance and disconfirmation.  This conclusion is also supported by previous 
research, but the magnitudes of these relationships are slightly different.  In previous 
research, disconfirmation was shown to be the most influential, but these data support 
performance as the strongest predictor. 
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Can guidance be given in target selection to increase return on investment on 
infrastructure targets with respect to citizen satisfaction? 
To maximize the effect of humanitarian assistance, targets should be selected in 
areas where citizens have low ratings of disconfirmation and performance of government 
services.  This condition may represent a situation in which there is a potential to improve 
these ratings through investment in low-performing services that may result in higher 
gains in citizen satisfaction when compared to the costs or time necessary to improve 
quality of services that are rated as high performance. 
 
Is the model of predicting citizen satisfaction sensitive to sample size? 
The data analysis conducted through resampling returned statistically identical 
results as expected.  As a result, the outputs of regression analysis were identical to the 
original data set.  The model was not demonstrated to be sensitive to sample size given 
the suggested minimum samples for data analysis are met.  This anticipated minimum 
sample size was 76 for each data point before and after the treatment (Cohen, 1992). 
 
Review of Findings 
Overall, this model was supported by the data, but there are improvements that 
can be made.  Improvements in data collection may improve results, but further analysis 
of the model is warranted.  The distribution of the model output of predicted citizen 
satisfaction appears similar to the actual data with some discrepancies.  Figure 15 shows 
the distribution of the actual survey data, and Figure 16 shows the distribution of the 
predicted value of citizen satisfaction given performance and disconfirmation values.  
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Upon inspection, it appears that the model may return insufficient results in the extremes 
of citizen satisfaction.  The actual data in Figure 15 show, a large number of surveys that 
rate in the 1, 1.33, and 1.67 range, but the predicted data in Figure 16 show few results 
below 1.33 but many more below 2; similarly, the actual data show many more results 
above 4, whereas the predicted values begin to taper off prior to values of 4.  This is 
expected considering the regression analysis attempted to fit a normal curve to the data 
which inherently reduces the data points in the “tails” of the distributions. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Histogram of Actual Citizen Satisfaction 
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Figure 16: Histogram of Predicted Citizen Satisfaction 
 
Further analysis was conducted on these values.  The difference between the 
predicted and actual values was calculated for each record in the data.  This difference 
was then divided by the actual value to return a percent error; a predicted value higher 
than the actual value is indicated by a negative percent error value, and a predicted value 
higher than the actual value is indicated by a negative percent error value.  These results 
are plotted in a histogram in Figure 17.  This figure indicates that the model is under-
estimating the value of satisfaction frequently by a small margin, but also greatly 
overestimates the rating of satisfaction sporadically out to an extreme of 154%.  The long 
tail in the data suggests that further analysis of these extreme values may yield further 
explanation. 
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Figure 17: Histogram of Predicted vs Actual Percent Error 
 
The previously discussed distributions also returned descriptive statistics, which 
are included in Table 9.  These statistics indicate that the predicted values for citizen 
satisfaction have a tighter distribution around the mean with a lower standard deviation, 
where the actual vales have a flatter, less normal distribution.  While both distributions 
have identical means, the predicted value distribution has a higher median value.  
Additionally, the distribution of error indicates that predicted citizen satisfaction is on 
average 7.76% higher than the actual value. 
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Citizen Satisfaction Distribution 
 
Distribution 
Mean 
(µ) 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
(σ) 
Upper 
95% Mean 
Lower 
95% Mean 
Actual 
Satisfaction 
2.58 2.33 0.96 2.65 2.50 
Predicted 
Satisfaction 
2.58 2.48 0.72 2.63 2.51 
Percent  
Error 
-7.76% 0.07% 32.2% -5.24% -10.3% 
 
A plot of the predicted values and prediction interval compared to the actual 
satisfaction values is presented in Figure 18.  The vertical axis represents citizen 
satisfaction and the x axis indicates the row of data.  The upper red and lower blue lines 
represent the 95% confidence interval of the predicted value, and the green stars indicate 
the actual value of citizen satisfaction.  The values of predicted citizen satisfaction were 
listed along the x-axis from lowest to highest, with the predicted value of citizen 
satisfaction in orange between the upper red and lower blue lines.  The actual values of 
citizen satisfaction were an average of three questions in the survey instrument, which 
resulted in the actual values clustering in 0.333 increments, with a few instances of a 
value that was averaged from two values due to a missing response.  The degree of 
variation between the predicted and actual values does not appear to have a clear 
relationship or pattern.  The scale for responses in the survey was a 1-5 Likert scale; 
therefore, the actual values all range between one and five, while the predicted values and 
confidence intervals range well outside both of these extremes.   
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Figure 18: Predicted and Actual Citizen Satisfaction Values 
 
The additional figures presented in this section yield interesting results.  The 
histograms and plot graphically show the high degree of unexplained variation in the 
model.  This may indicate that there is an unmeasured variable influencing the value of 
citizen satisfaction and merits further research. 
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Significance of Research 
This research contributed to the body of knowledge regarding the relationship of 
expectation, perception of performance, and disconfirmation on citizen satisfaction with 
government services in a less industrialized country that may be applied towards a target 
selection methodology for humanitarian assistance projects.  This research may also 
benefit municipal governments by contributing to the body of knowledge by further 
exploring the influence of government service performance on citizen satisfaction.  
 
Future Research 
Problems encountered with the survey methodology were discussed in Chapter II, 
but further explanation is necessary.  Follow-on survey analysis of these project locations 
in Belize is warranted to determine the true impact of these projects after citizens have 
opportunities to evaluate the improvement of these government services, and a more 
robust sampling plan should be developed and implemented regarding the sampling of 
both control and treatment locations.  Future survey data collection should be done 
verbally with data recorded by trained personnel.  Additionally, the survey instrument 
should be translated into Spanish for another survey deployment, and should also be 
back-translated into English to confirm that the initial translation is accurate. 
It is unclear whether variation in the data can be improved only by improvement 
in survey methodology, or if there is an unmeasured variable that is also influencing 
citizen satisfaction.  Previous research by LAPOP have surveyed trust in government, 
which indicated that citizens in Belize have a relatively low rating of their government 
compared to other Latin American countries.  Further research should include a series of 
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measures to survey a citizen’s trust in government, as well as variables such as their 
perceptions of fairness and justice, to determine if these have an effect on a citizen’s 
satisfaction with government services. 
Determining the impact of foreign aid has been illustrated as difficult task in need 
of further research.  In particular, the relationship of distance from a given project is not 
well understood (Fischerkeller, 2011).  This relationship can be further explored using a 
combination of surveys and GIS software if the project location and attributes are known 
along with the location of the survey collection point or the respondent’s residence 
location.  Using these data sets, a relationship between distance, or areal units, to citizen 
satisfaction may be developed.  For example, survey collected regarding a school project 
from respondents that live within that school district compared to respondents outside the 
school district may have different results.  Does a citizen that lives within that school 
district reflect a higher level of satisfaction after a project is accomplished?  Will a citizen 
that lives outside that school district see an increase in satisfaction due to this 
improvement, or possibly see a decrease in satisfaction due to an improvement that did 
not benefit him or her? These are important questions that could improve target selection 
for humanitarian projects. 
An additional impact of foreign aid that is unknown is at what rate the impact of 
aid diminishes in the collective memory of the population.  The relationship of decay of 
an impact with time is not well understood and is often cited as an important question for 
determining targeting and execution of further aid (Fischerkeller, 2011).  This 
information could be used to maximize the sustainment of an increased level of 
 69 
satisfaction with an optimization of resources expended over the course of several 
projects in series for a long-term impact. 
Additional survey sampling of the areas where projects were executed in 
Operation NEW HORIZONS 14 in the following years can assist in answering both of 
the previously identified questions.  Using the survey data collected in this research and 
comparing to follow-on results with higher resolution location information can build 
upon the body of knowledge in this area. 
 
Summary 
This research explored the relationships of expectation, performance, and 
disconfirmation on citizen satisfaction.  This research built upon the analysis of Hansen 
(2015) and used the same survey data set for regression and dominance analysis which 
resulted in the development of a new model for predicting citizen satisfaction.  This 
research proposed a model that may be used to predict citizen satisfaction given 
performance and disconfirmation, which may be useful in target selection for 
humanitarian assistance projects.  This research was not conclusive in the determination 
of citizen satisfaction, but it contributes to the body of knowledge with respect to citizen 
satisfaction decisions. 
 
 
 70 
Appendix A:  Survey Instrument 
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Appendix B:  Research Approval Documentation 
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Appendix C:  R Code 
library(e1071) 
 
survey <- read.csv("JoelR12.csv", head=TRUE)  
# reads .csv file from directory to dataframe “survey” 
 
R = 10000     
# sets R iterations of for loop, insensitive 
 
S = 1      
# sets S iterations of sampling, very sensitive 
 
index = 1:length(survey$E1)  
# sets index vector for mult variable sampling 
 
rEAvg <- numeric(R)  # defines bootstrap data vectors 
rPAvg <- numeric(R) 
rDAvg <- numeric(R) 
rSatAvg <- numeric(R) 
 
bootData <- data.frame(rEAvg, rPAvg, rDAvg, rSatAvg) 
#defines bootstrap data frame 
 
for (i in 1:R)   # takes R samples w/ replacement 
{ 
 bootindex = sample(index, S, replace=T)   
 bootData$rEAvg[i] = survey$EAvg[bootindex]  
 bootData$rPAvg[i] = survey$PAvg[bootindex] 
 bootData$rDAvg[i] = survey$DAvg[bootindex] 
 bootData$rSatAvg[i] = survey$SatAvg[bootindex] 
} 
 
# record summary stats to compare between actual (sumX) and 
bootstrap (sumrX) data 
 
x = 5 
sumVar <- c("Mean", "Median", "StdDev",  
"Skewness", "Kurtosis") 
sumE <- numeric(x)   
sumrE <- numeric(x) 
sumP <- numeric(x) 
sumrP <- numeric(x) 
sumD <- numeric(x) 
sumrD <- numeric(x) 
sumSat <- numeric(x) 
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sumrSat <- numeric(x) 
 
sumData <- data.frame(sumVar, sumE, sumrE, sumP, sumrP,  
 sumD, sumrD, sumSat, sumrSat) 
# defines summary stats data frame 
 
sumData[1, 2] = mean(survey$EAvg) 
sumData[2, 2] = median(survey$EAvg) 
sumData[3, 2] = sd(survey$EAvg) 
sumData[4, 2] = skewness(survey$EAvg) 
sumData[5, 2] = kurtosis(survey$EAvg) 
 
sumData[1, 4] = mean(survey$PAvg) 
sumData[2, 4] = median(survey$PAvg) 
sumData[3, 4] = sd(survey$PAvg) 
sumData[4, 4] = skewness(survey$PAvg) 
sumData[5, 4] = kurtosis(survey$PAvg) 
 
sumData[1, 6] = mean(survey$DAvg) 
sumData[2, 6] = median(survey$DAvg) 
sumData[3, 6] = sd(survey$DAvg) 
sumData[4, 6] = skewness(survey$DAvg) 
sumData[5, 6] = kurtosis(survey$DAvg) 
 
sumData[1, 8] = mean(survey$SatAvg) 
sumData[2, 8] = median(survey$SatAvg) 
sumData[3, 8] = sd(survey$SatAvg) 
sumData[4, 8] = skewness(survey$SatAvg) 
sumData[5, 8] = kurtosis(survey$SatAvg) 
 
#populates summary table data from actual data 
 
for (k in 1:4) # populate summary table data from bootstrap 
{ 
 sumData[1, (2*k)+1] = mean(bootData[,k]) 
 sumData[2, (2*k)+1] = median(bootData[,k]) 
 sumData[3, (2*k)+1] = sd(bootData[,k]) 
 sumData[4, (2*k)+1] = skewness(bootData[,k]) 
 sumData[5, (2*k)+1] = kurtosis(bootData[,k]) 
} 
 
write.csv(bootData, file="resampleR12Avg.csv") 
write.csv(sumData, file="sumR12Avg.csv", row.names=T) 
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Appendix D:  Additional Resampling Results 
Table 10: Round 1 Data 
 Original Data, n = 172 Resampled Data, n = 10,000 
Variable E P D Sat E P D Sat 
Mean 4.35 2.86 2.75 2.45 4.34 2.87 2.76 2.46 
Median 4.42 2.85 2.67 2.33 4.33 2.88 2.67 2.33 
Std Dev 0.68 0.70 0.89 0.91 0.68 0.69 0.88 0.91 
 
Table 11: Round 2 Data 
 Original Data, n = 455 Resampled Data, n = 10,000 
Variable E P D Sat E P D Sat 
Mean 4.56 2.99 2.91 2.62 4.56 2.99 2.91 2.63 
Median 4.67 3.00 3.00 2.67 4.67 3.00 3.00 2.67 
Std Dev 0.59 0.76 0.94 0.97 0.59 0.76 0.94 0.97 
 
Table 12: Non-Project Location Data 
 Original Data, n = 322 Resampled Data, n = 10,000 
Variable E P D Sat E P D Sat 
Mean 4.49 2.98 2.85 2.56 4.50 2.99 2.87 2.58 
Median 4.67 2.88 2.67 2.33 4.67 2.88 2.67 2.33 
Std Dev 0.64 0.79 0.95 1.01 0.62 0.79 0.95 1.01 
 
Table 13: Project Location Data 
 Original Data, n = 302 Resampled Data, n = 10,000 
Variable E P D Sat E P D Sat 
Mean 4.51 2.93 2.89 2.60 4.52 2.93 2.88 2.60 
Median 4.67 2.88 3.00 2.33 4.67 2.88 3.00 2.33 
Std Dev 0.61 0.69 0.90 0.89 0.60 0.70 0.90 0.89 
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Table 14: Round 1 Data at a Non-Project Location 
 Original Data, n = 114 Resampled Data, n = 10,000 
Variable E P D Sat E P D Sat 
Mean 4.31 2.71 2.54 2.23 4.31 2.71 2.53 2.24 
Median 4.42 2.67 2.50 2.00 4.50 2.63 2.33 2.00 
Std Dev 0.74 0.68 0.86 0.83 0.73 0.67 0.85 0.82 
 
Table 15: Round 1 Data at a Project Location 
 Original Data, n = 56 Resampled Data, n = 10,000 
Variable E P D Sat E P D Sat 
Mean 4.42 3.13 3.18 2.89 4.43 3.13 3.18 2.90 
Median 4.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.67 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Std Dev 0.53 0.66 0.80 0.92 0.52 0.65 0.79 0.91 
 
Table 16: Round 2 Data at a Non-Project Location 
 Original Data, n = 208 Resampled Data, n = 10,000 
Variable E P D Sat E P D Sat 
Mean 4.60 3.13 3.02 2.74 4.60 3.13 3.03 2.74 
Median 4.67 3.00 3.00 2.67 4.67 3.00 3.00 2.67 
Std Dev 0.55 0.82 0.96 1.06 0.54 0.81 0.96 1.05 
 
Table 17: Round 2 Data at a Project Location 
 Original Data, n = 247 Resampled Data, n = 10,000 
Variable E P D Sat E P D Sat 
Mean 4.53 2.88 2.81 2.52 4.53 2.88 2.81 2.53 
Median 4.67 2.88 3.00 2.33 4.67 2.88 3.00 2.33 
Std Dev 0.62 0.69 0.92 0.88 0.63 0.69 0.91 0.88 
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